Last week’s suicide by a government biodefense researcher who had been linked to the mailing of anthrax-laced letters in 2001 has raised thorny questions about whether the benefits of biodefense research outweigh the risks. Researcher Bruce Ivins had reportedly been informed by the FBI that he was about to be indicted for murder in the incident that killed five people and sent 17 more to the hospital.
Some observers point out that biodefense research has vastly increased since the terrorist attacks of 2001, and raise the question: Has the unprecedented boom in biodefense research made the country less secure by multiplying the places and people with access to dangerous germs? … Nationwide, an estimated 14,000 people work at about 400 laboratories and have permission to work with so-called select agents, which could be used in a bioterror attack, although not all are authorized to handle the most toxic substances, like anthrax [The New York Times].
Yet Ivins may have been motivated by the desire to spur a further increase of biodefense spending and research, former acquaintances said. One former senior official with Ivins’ employer … said he believed his former colleague wanted more attention — and resources — shifted to biological defense. “It had to have been a motive,” said the former official, who suspects that Ivins was the culprit. “I don’t think he ever intended to kill anybody. He just wanted to prove ‘Look, this is possible.’ He probably had no clue that it would aerosolize through those envelopes and kill those postal workers” [Los Angeles Times].
Ivins’ biography is full of contradictions. He was a trusted researcher for the U.S. Army for 35 years and received a commendation from the Department of Defense, yet his therapist described him as a “revenge killer” who had been diagnosed by several psychiatrists as “a sociopathic, homicidal killer” [AP]. The news of Ivins’ apparent instability is likely to draw more attention to the possibility of “insider threats” at government and university labs. Officials may be compelled to further scrutinize researchers who work with select agents, [biological weapons expert Jonathan] Tucker says, adding that some questions have already been raised about “the adequacy of the screening process” used by the FBI to determine if a scientist should be allowed to work with a dangerous pathogen [ScienceNOW Daily News].
For a critique of Homeland Security’s spending on biodefense in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks, check out last year’s DISCOVER article, “Homeland Insecurity.”
Image: flickr/vieux bandit
August 5th, 2008 at 11:06 am
“Army Researcher’s Anthrax Attack Raises Concerns Over Biodefense Labs”
It should say “suspected of anthrax attacks.”
The guy was never charged, indicted, convicted.
Maybe he did it, maybe he didn’t. But until it’s “proven,” you can’t write it like it’s fact
August 7th, 2008 at 3:37 pm
DOD is spending (mis-spending?) millions and millions each year in the former Soviet countries to improve biosecurity and prevent the theft of biological materials. They are also engaged with former weapons scientists from the former UsSR. If it took 7 years to catch Ivins, who was right under their nose in the US, how long would it take DOD to catch any mischievious activities of the hundreds of US contractors working now side by side with former USSR bioweapons scientists? Ivins had a government clearance, was commended, rewarded by DOD — and it took way too long to catch him. It is frightening to think how the millions from the US DOD are being misused in these former soviet countries at the moment due to poor judgment, poor oversight, naivete and corruption.
August 19th, 2008 at 4:24 pm
Steve Davies: You’re quite right, that was an editing error. I’ve put an “alleged” into the headline.
February 11th, 2009 at 3:40 pm
Facilities that do animal testing are inherently self-selecting for sociopaths and psychopaths. It’s notorious that serial killers typically start with animals.
Whether Ivans was involved or not this was bound to happen and there’s a good chance that it will happen again.
A correct screening process wouldn’t hire anybody that would want to work there. Selecting for people that can torture animals day in and day out without pity and giving them access to the most dangerous bioweapons known to man is a really, really bad idea.