Yes, it’s a good explanation, Peter, as far as it goes. I think there’s a lot more to science than skepticism however. And the way science is really practiced and really taught in schools is a good deal different from this ideal. I suppose that’s a different topic however.

Tom Marking said: “I agree with Barton on this one.”

I suppose I do too. But that doesn’t mean that empiricism is just like any other belief system, or no better than any other belief system.

Empiricism has shown itself to be much better than other belief systems at consistently explaining the world and the universe, and has generated a lot more knowledge than other belief systems. On top of that, it’s simple and low maintenance, where one theory can explain a range of phenomena. For example, gravity explains why the planets orbit the Sun, and also explains why a stone falls from your hand to the ground.

Now it’s possible that God might be twiddling a series of levers and knobs, making the planets constantly move in a manner which makes it look as though they’re moving in accordance with gravity, and making that stone accelerate out of your hand towards the ground at 9.8 metres per second squared. And it might be that at some point in the future, God might decide to change a few parameters, and make the planets move in a way contrary to what gravity would suggest. But in the absence of any such evidence, I think it’s reasonable to assume that the universe behaves in predictable ways because of physical laws we’ve been able to discover thanks to our acceptance of empiricism.

You asked: “Is [Pyrrho’s] the same philosophy that BA and Karen Stollznow are using with regards to science or is it different?”

It’s different.

The main difference I see between Pyrrho’s skepticism and modern skepticism is the acceptance by modern skeptics that provisional acceptance can and should be given to a claim supported by a preponderance of evidence. Pyrrho’s skepticism seems to me to be a lot closer to what underlies post-modernism and relativism.

I accept that, for the sake of argument, the contradiction to any idea may be advanced. But I don’t think that every contradiction can be advanced “…with equal justification…”

For example, take this idea: “Jumping out a tenth storey window onto concrete 30 metres below is dangerous.” Its contradiction is, “jumping out a tenth storey window onto concrete 30 metres below is not dangerous.” The two statements can be made, but I think the preponderance of evidence would suggest the first may be advanced with more justification than the second.

In other words, as I said in my previous post, suspend judgement; but not permanently, only until there’s some evidence. Then make a judgement.

The point I’m trying to make is that a skeptical attitude isn’t just some philosophy with little practical use in everyday life. It underlies good science, and it’s also a useful tool for helping us avoid being taken advantage of in everyday life. Am I making this point well enough, or does it not follow for you?

Stalker? Don’t flatter yourself. It’s so un-Christian, remember?

All beliefs are not equal. Subjective and unsubstantiated religious belief does not have the equal weight of belief in objective physical evidence.

The former only trusts and relies on the unverifiable testimonies of writers of questionable authenticity and about superantural events that have no tangible evidence. Nothing in the Bible or Koran etc can be set up as an experiment today and repeated by others now to confirm what is put forth as so called universal truths.
Just because someone has a “spirtual transformation” in their life is not proof to all that the experience is real and universal.

Even if empiricism cannot be absolutely proven except some unknown way outside of the system we live in, we have to have something consensual to agree on as real and trustworthy as evidence. I will place my provisional trust in what rationality and science can deliver over the subjective, non-duplicatible beliefs of religious faith.

I agree with Barton on this one. Any system of human thought whether it be science, religion, mathematics, etc., etc. must rely on principles that are assumed to be true and cannot be proved within the system itself. If that were not the case then all arguments within the system would be circular since even the axioms/postulates of the system would be provable from within the system and they in turn would be used to prove other statements/theorems.

I believe Kurt Godel had something to say about the subject as well:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_completeness_theorem

Of course, it’s not my main interest to catch anyone in a contradiction although that may happen from time to time. I guess the broader issue I would bring up is that the term Skepticism already has a long philosophical background beginning with certain Greek philosophers in the 4th century B.C. One of the most famous was Pyrrho of Elis (360 – 270 B.C.).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyrrho

“The main principle of Pyrrho’s thought is expressed by the word acatalepsia, which connotes the impossibility of knowing things in their own nature; against every statement its contradiction may be advanced with equal justification. Secondly, it is necessary in view of this fact to preserve an attitude of intellectual suspense, or, as Timon expressed it, no assertion can be known to be better than another. Thirdly, Pyrrho applied these results to life in general, concluding that, since nothing can be known, the only proper attitude is ataraxia, “freedom from worry”.”

So Pyrrho is essentially saying that we can’t know anything, at least not finally. This seems to be most similar to dictionary definition 1a: the doctrine that true knowledge or knowledge in a particular area is uncertain.

Now the big question is this. Is this the same philosophy that BA and Karen Stollznow are using with regards to science or is it different? If it is the same then what basis does BA (or anyone else for that matter) have in claiming that evolution is “better” than ID? Ultimately you can never know since knowledge is always provisional. Theory A may seem better than theory B today, but new evidence may be found at any time to reverse that judgment.