Comments on: Is religion an adaptation?

By: razib

razib — Thu, 29 Mar 2007 19:05:23 +0000

So maybe crazy** human religiousness is too.
I think the evidence points strongly in the byproduct direction though.
well…we need to be careful about not getting stuck into and either/or bind. the ‘strong form’ of the argument for religion=adaptation basically works like the argument that religion=language, as if it is a fixed genetic trait (and, there are occasional mono-genic arguments about the trait). i don’t deny the possibility of frequency dependent/diversifying selection. but, the frequency of “believing in god” is higher than women who can attain organisms world wide….

By: Jason Malloy

Jason Malloy — Thu, 29 Mar 2007 18:56:12 +0000

For instance crazy* human intelligence is an adaptation, but still lots o’ persistent variation. So maybe crazy** human religiousness is too.
I think the evidence points strongly in the byproduct direction though.
* figurative
** literal

By: Jason Malloy

Jason Malloy — Thu, 29 Mar 2007 18:49:47 +0000

This is why I am skeptical of direct selection for religiosity qua religiosity, the fact that religious sentiment seems to exhibit a range It's been harder for me to use this argument after this Hawks post:

"There is no simple answer to these questions, we have no knowledge whatever about the genes influencing [religiousness], and hence, it is impossible to make categorical statements about the likely heritability of the character after a history of selection.
If, as I think is a more likely scenario, there are alternative adaptive strategies toward [religiousness] in humans, then it is not only likely, but necessary that the trait have substantial heritability."

By: Shmuel

Shmuel — Thu, 29 Mar 2007 14:29:34 +0000

This seems to be the important part then:
“Even if religion is “made out of” more primitive cognitive processes like curiosity and empathy, it could still be an adaptation if we find some specific modifiers to those cognitive processes that act to produce religion, and those modifiers have a biological basis.”
I guess I don’t understand what such a “modifier” looks like. Can you give an example using language? I.e. can you give an example of such a biological mechanism that “modifies” such component cognitive processes (of language) that act to produce language?

By: windy

windy — Thu, 29 Mar 2007 09:01:24 +0000

Just those modifiers I mentioned – to be an adaptation, religion should be at least partly due to a biological modifier of its “parts” (and this modifier must have been selected for)

By: Shmuel

Shmuel — Thu, 29 Mar 2007 01:35:17 +0000

I was following you until you got to “that special something”. Can you explain?

By: windy

windy — Thu, 29 Mar 2007 01:12:21 +0000

OK so a fossil record isn’t *necessary* but it certainly isn’t evidence *against* a particular trait being an adaptation right? It seems that this is what PZ is doing above. It seems ass backwards. Or am I missing something?
I don’t see anything from PZ about precursors of language or about how many genes control it. Are you referring to some earlier discussion?
Terms like “fossil record” and “primitive components” might be a bit confusing here. Are you talking about evolutionary precursors of religion or just basal mental traits (like curiosity) that might underly religion?
Language could be the result of a single, bizarre mutation (as Chomsky once suggested).
I think this is a bit of a red herring since few biologists would favor Chomsky’s hopeful monster theory. But it depends on what you mean by “result”- single mutations can cause drastic modifications in earlier structures. Recently there was an article on how a single mutation might be responsible for the elongation of digits in bat wings. But a single gene doesn’t “make the wing” – the forelimb was there as a precursor. In addition, many other small changes in bat bodies and brains were most likely needed to fully take advantage of flight.
Bat wings, human eyes, and language can probably all be decomposed into more primitive components, but the point is that so far we have more information on wing-, eye-, and language-’specific’ structures than religion-’specific’ structures, thus it is easier to argue that the former are adaptations. Even if religion is “made out of” more primitive cognitive processes like curiosity and empathy, it could still be an adaptation if we find some specific modifiers to those cognitive processes that act to produce religion, and those modifiers have a biological basis. I think PZ is saying that religion doesn’t have “that special something”, not that adaptations can’t be made out of basic components.

By: Shmuel

Shmuel — Wed, 28 Mar 2007 21:56:36 +0000

Yes, sorry. Taking a “not” out:
What these particular biologists are arguing is that language has no cognitive “primitives” and that this further suggests it is indeed an adaptation. Alternatively, they claim that religion is not an adaptation because it does reduce to more primitive cognitive components.
you don’t need a fossil record to see/note/detect selection (which implies adaptation
OK so a fossil record isn’t *necessary* but it certainly isn’t evidence *against* a particular trait being an adaptation right? It seems that this is what PZ is doing above. It seems ass backwards. Or am I missing something?
Language could be the result of a single, bizarre mutation (as Chomsky once suggested). But even if this were the case, how does this make it a better example of an adaptation than a trait that decomposes into more “primitive” or “basic” components? Is the human eye less of an adaptation because it can be ‘decomposed” into more “primitive” parts, like the kinds of photoreceptor cells found in organisms without eyes?

By: windy

windy — Wed, 28 Mar 2007 21:26:48 +0000

The post to which this one refers?
The bit I quoted, naturally. “One now finds” that leading atheists proselytize for this and that. Where does one find it?
What these particular biologists are arguing is that language has no cognitive “primitives” and that this further suggests it is indeed an adaptation.
Who is arguing that, and in what context?
Alternatively, they claim that religion is not an adaptation because it does not reduce to more primitive cognitive components.
Did you mean that it reduces to components, otherwise this is a bit contradictory?

By: razib

razib — Wed, 28 Mar 2007 21:15:15 +0000

What these particular biologists are arguing is that language has no cognitive “primitives” and that this further suggests it is indeed an adaptation. Alternatively, they claim that religion is not an adaptation because it does not reduce to more primitive cognitive components.
did you type this right? it seems you’re saying both groups believe in the same thing.
But if language has no cognitive “fossil record” so to speak, then there is actually less evidence that it is an adaptation, right.
clarify? you don’t need a fossil record to see/note/detect selection (which implies adaptation). foxp2 might actually be the first stages in elucidating the molecular evolutionary back story toward how language might have evolved.

By: Shmuel

Shmuel — Wed, 28 Mar 2007 20:28:31 +0000

“Please cite some evidence in support of this view.”
The post to which this one refers?
“If evolutionary biologists say “language is probably an adaptation”, it doesn’t mean that they must “blindly accept” Chomsky’s nonsensical views about evolution.”
What these particular biologists are arguing is that language has no cognitive “primitives” and that this further suggests it is indeed an adaptation. Alternatively, they claim that religion is not an adaptation because it does not reduce to more primitive cognitive components. But if language has no cognitive “fossil record” so to speak, then there is actually less evidence that it is an adaptation, right. So their argument makes little sense to me. and it doesn’t seem very productive. (Unless one’s goal is to “hijack” the same impulse towards curiosity to transform atheism into a religion. More irony.)
I myself don’t necessarily believe that something like “religion” is best understood as an adaptation (like language) but I find the current analogy quite awful. I.e. Language is to English as Curiosity is to Religion is rather incoherent.

By: J. J. Ramsey

J. J. Ramsey — Wed, 28 Mar 2007 16:56:33 +0000

Tyler DiPietro: “I favor a policy containment rather than direct confrontation when it comes to religion.”
From known “Chamberlain” atheist Chris at Mixing Memory:
“Would it not be better to recognize that the content of specific religions has, historically, varied according to the spirit of the times, and therefore the most effective avenue for social critique is to focus on changing that spirit, thereby necessarily effecting change in the content of religion? If you want to make the religious less intolerant, and less hostile towards members of outgroups, wouldn’t it be better to work towards a society that is itself less intolerant and hostile towards members of outgrups? … it is the responsibility of anyone with a progressive world-view, recognizing that religion will not go away, to force religion to change by changing its environment and thereby forcing it to adapt.”
That looks like a form of containment to me, albeit somewhat different from what you’ve described.

By: windy

windy — Wed, 28 Mar 2007 15:45:15 +0000

But one must admit that it’s a bit ironic that one now finds that, not only do “leading” Evangelical Atheists proselytize, but they also blindly accept a theory of language that is at best “agnostic” to evolutionary processes and at worst, reliant on a “deus ex machina” explanation for language origins.
Please cite some evidence in support of this view.
If evolutionary biologists say “language is probably an adaptation”, it doesn’t mean that they must “blindly accept” Chomsky’s nonsensical views about evolution.

By: Tyler DiPietro

Tyler DiPietro — Tue, 27 Mar 2007 23:56:53 +0000

perhaps you should elucidate your own interpretation to the churchillian position? i'm going mostly on what i see on pz's weblog and the general thrust of the god delusion (i've read it). Actually, upon reflection I don't think I'm quite "Churchillian" with religion. Perhaps my position is more along the lines of "George Kennan atheism", that is, I favor a policy containment rather than direct confrontation when it comes to religion. Namely, I would like to see religion held on a similar level to alien abductions and Ouija boards. Prevalent and likely the result of the same cognitive instincts as religion, but not nearly as encouraged, venerated or sacrosanct.

By: razib

razib — Tue, 27 Mar 2007 17:40:48 +0000

j.j. ramsey’s point is spot on. john says: Usually, when westerners talk about ‘religion’ they mean Protestant Christianity’s social structures, function, etc…, but cognitive anthropologists aren’t talking about religion in this way. no matter what term you use they are speaking of the suite of correlated tendencies that ramsey is alluding to. as chris states, they’re all pretty mundane cognitive processes.
don’t think that’s an argument against the Churchillian position anymore than the inevitable persistence of some level of homophobia is an argument against the condemnation of the latter.
perhaps you should elucidate your own interpretation to the churchillian position? i’m going mostly on what i see on pz’s weblog and the general thrust of the god delusion (i’ve read it). i think we should be careful here about analogies. making a correspondence between religion and language is giving the former too much “innate” properties, but making one between religion and homophobia is not giving it enough, IMO.

By: J. J. Ramsey

J. J. Ramsey — Tue, 27 Mar 2007 15:01:23 +0000

Tyler DiPietro: “In how many cultures has there been a hard and fast (and widely understood) distinction between the natural and the supernatural?”
Not many, I don’t think. However, IIRC, even with those cultures, there is an understanding that the things that we would label as supernatural are the things that violate the folkmechanics, folkbiology, etc. of those cultures. Ghosts, even if considered a normal part of the landscape, are still considered counterintuitive.

By: Shmuel

Shmuel — Tue, 27 Mar 2007 14:45:32 +0000

Chris,
“Shmuel, you and I may be Tomaselloian empiricists, but the majority of people who study language are still Chomskyans”
No doubt because “Tomaselloain empiricist” is such a cumbersome label. But one must admit that it’s a bit ironic that one now finds that, not only do “leading” Evangelical Atheists proselytize, but they also blindly accept a theory of language that is at best “agnostic” to evolutionary processes and at worst, reliant on a “deus ex machina” explanation for language origins.

By: John B

John B — Tue, 27 Mar 2007 13:34:27 +0000

In how many cultures has there been a hard and fast (and widely understood) distinction between the natural and the supernatural?
Not many, the dichotomy is a projection of western scholarship onto other cultures. Likewise, most don’t have traditional separations between religion and non-religion. Usually, when westerners talk about ‘religion’ they mean Protestant Christianity’s social structures, function, etc…

By: Tyler DiPietro

Tyler DiPietro — Tue, 27 Mar 2007 07:09:51 +0000

If supernatural agent concepts, costly rituals, empathy, and decreasing mortality salience give every appearance of being the result of mundane cognitive and social processes, you have to wonder what it is about religion that was selected for itself.
Just wondering. In how many cultures has there been a hard and fast (and widely understood) distinction between the natural and the supernatural? It would seem that in most ancient cultures gods were just supermen, and our modern ideas about a supreme being beyond space and time, etc., are pretty recent developments. Could supernatural agent detection just be an extended form of people personifying a wedge when they shout “get in there, you bastard!” upon encountering difficulty? Or is it more specific than that?

By: Chris

Chris — Tue, 27 Mar 2007 06:54:13 +0000

Allen, the biggest problem with the direct adaptation view is that the central features of religion (e.g., supernatural agent concepts) not only display all the features we would expect if they were the results of normal cognitive/social processes, but if you manipulate those processes, it causes the expected changes in the relevant features of religion. If supernatural agent concepts, costly rituals, empathy, and decreasing mortality salience give every appearance of being the result of mundane cognitive and social processes, you have to wonder what it is about religion that was selected for itself.