Actually, we had engineering for a few thousand years before we had any science. Often the flow went the other way, eg thermodynamics after steam engines.

In reference to the debate on this thread, and in very shortest form, I am convinced that science is defined by method, but that the only justification for its method(s) is, ultimately, the creation of predictive rules that enable increased mastery of our physical environment.

In the book I propose and defend the propositions that: (1) while experimentation is a subset of science, science without controlled experiments is just sloppy philosophy (and I devote a chapter to considering the superficially falsifying cases of sciences like astrophysics or historical geology); (2) in general, controlled social experiments require randomization; (3) there have been some randomized experiments that have created tiny islands of truly scientific knowledge of human society, in the specific sense of identifying reliably some non-obvious social programs that improve human flourishing; (4) the application of these experimental methods is growing, should be encouraged, and is likely to create some improvements to this knowledge; but, (5) it is very unlikely that social science will in the foreseeable future create anything approaching a comprehensive understanding of society, and that our political institutions should be predicated on continuing, profound ignorance of what effects social interventions will actually have.

one more time I recommend the Brad DeLong link

That’s not really empirical, that’s more like a definition, and it’s circular because you put ion the “appropriate subject” caveat. In other words, if you have solid knowledge, you know that the subject was appropriate and that the scientifically method was applied appropriately.

You still can have secular, empirical, rational, hypothetical-deductive thinking about social things. You just won’t get results with the power clarity, and certainty of physics. (Even in physics, Heisenberg said that quantum physics was easy, but turbulence in fluids was impossible).

My concern has been, first, to get away from the pecking-order talk. More successful scientists believe that if they did social science they’d do a much better job of it, and sometimes they do, but history is littered with failed efforts, and in many respects econ has been one of them. Both Samuelson’s mathematization of econ and the more recent quant invasion may have done as much hatm as good.

http://isteve.blogspot.com/2010/08/jim-manzis-new-article.html

Yes, in general of course. But the specific question in the title of the post is exactly that: “how scientific is it?”. And the simple answer is “not at all”. Because we know empirically that scientific method, when applied to appropriate subject appropriately, gives solid knowledge. Ergo, “social sciences” are either not using scientific method correctly or their subjects are not appropriate for the application of the scientific method. In any case, it means that these sciences are not sciences at all.

“And it’s not true that if your knowledge isn’t scientific it’s nothing at all. Whether or not eco is a science, someone still has to make economic policy. What should they know?”

100% agree. Never meant to imply otherwise. Science is only a tool. And tools have their limits.
Philosophy is not a science. I don’t think anyone is saying it shouldn’t exist.

Right, but you need good method to achieve success. Before even method, though, you need to define the problem. The social sciences have never really defined what they’re studying and are flailing about because of it.

They generate a lot of information, but have no way of interpreting it.

I think these do exist in “social sciences” but they aren’t very robust. Crowd models and traffic models DO work more than they don’t. The people movement models used by architects work more than they fail. I think there are many more that have a significant probability of describing reality more than they fail. I think these models aren’t the point often in descriptions of social sciences, so perhaps their limitations and actual successes aren’t out there.

It is science to understand that because of chaotic interactions one CANNOT get a high probability prediction, and to understand what kind of group statistics might be applicable under those conditions. That is one of the things that distinguish science – understanding its limits in precision and area of applicability. So I would answer YES to the question mark. But what that yes consists of hasn’t been well delimited to me.

fair enough. but let’s observe that we’re talking about economics, and not sociology or anthropology. part of this is about relevance. economics has a lot of real-world impact in terms of influence in the halls of power. but part of it is clarity. cultural anthropology and sociology are by and large not even science today, and don’t make a pretense to be such (more so cult anthropology than sociology). at least in the USA.

In various areas of study science has had tremendous successes, and social scientists started hoping that they too could have such tremendous successes. But they were, by and large, overoptimistic.

The question about economic, sociology, anthropology, etc. shouldn’t be “How scientific is it?” but “How good is it?” And it’s not true that if your knowledge isn’t scientific it’s nothing at all. Whether or not eco is a science, someone still has to make economic policy. What should they know?

Razib, I’m not so sure that the errors of economics are as easily corrected as that. Sometimes they are.

But acknowledging these realities is not the same as advocating a complete abstention from looking far ahead. There is a fundamental difference between decisions that are good only if a particular prediction turns out to be correct—and the ones that are good for a range of alternative futures: scenarios, rather than point forecasts, are thus much more valuable, both from heuristic and from practical points of view. As the future is inherently unpredictable, it is the decision analysis or contingency planning under a range of alternative scenarios that should be pursued most diligently. Techniques comprising this approach range from narrative and normative scenarios to Monte Carlo simulations and to stochastic programming.”

One heterodox economist, Daniel Davies, says that within academic economics, encumbered by a lot of other stuff, there’s a nice little science of management trying to get out.

1) economists are very smart

2) economics is very hard

3) economics as a discipline has had very significant real-world impacts in terms of policy

4) economists are often wrong

the combination of #3 and #4 is the major issue combined with the arrogance which goes with #1. if economic orthodoxy is as de facto contingent as it often seems to be, there needs to be a softer touch (in an idealized/stylized situation economics can make very good predictions, the problem is that those situations may be a lot rarer than we assumed).

the flip side of this is that unlike cultural anthropology or sociology the errors of economics can be corrected because the errors are clear and distinct. i’ve given upon those fields, but not economics. but economists do sometimes seem to operationally confuse clarity of language (formalism) with clarity of understanding. you’re still looking through the glass darkly dawgz.

By and large I think that it’s a mistaken game. The important thing about any area of study is how good a job it does with the material it works with, not about where it stands in the pecking order. Furthermore, the whole game involves demanding kinds of results from the proposed scientists which are not possible because of the nature of their objects of study.

A lot of this is similar to what Daniel K is saying.

BUT: economists have played this game way too hard, and they need to be brought down. And they aren’t to blame for not achieving the impossible, but they’re to blame for claiming to have done it. And because of the worldly power of their biz, the possibility of corruption is serious.

When you have a well known economist calling fellow economists stupid for disagreeing with him on a regular basis in a widely read newspaper, it doesn’t suggest economists are particularly humble.