But might this offer evidence that democratization really can overwhelm fundamentalism in Muslim countries rather quickly. That Salafism mixed with democracy may follow a course closer to the evanescent anarchism of foreign-born americans than to the lasting phenomenon of anarchism/violent political nihilism in Russia?

I’m really not sold on how much the religion can be credited for all the disturbing thing we see coming out of the Islamic world. I’ve now lived in two Muslim countries (for 2+ years apiece), in Uzbekistan and Algeria. Taking my perceptions with a grain of salt (I’m terrible at languages, so it’s entirely possible I missed a LOT of sublties when chatting with locals about life, the universe, and everything), I got the distinct impression that cultural quirks get pinned on religion, when in fact religion is just the window dressing for the way tribes, ethnic groups, cities, and professions have evolved over the centuries.

For example, in Uzbekistan there are regions where you will see horrific treatment of women, Taliban style, and regions where women basically run society and the men seem quietly relieved that they don’t have to worry about being in charge. There’s about the same level of understanding and adherence to Islam, they’re all Sunni, and yet in Ferghana it’s scandalous if somebody goes to jail for murdering their daughter in law, while in Karakalpakstan it’s scandalous if a daughter in law gets injured.

Similarly in Algeria (and there I really can’t claim much local knowledge, because that weird French/Berber/Arabic hybrid of a language they speak is COMPLETELY impossible to learn), the general level of religiosity seemed much higher than in Central Asia, where the Soviets had spent a lot of time and effort wiping out religion. Yet there’s a huge variation in political views and cultural practices. The Arabs are still seen as interlopers and invaders, and resented deeply by the Berber population, but all of them are struggling with what to do about the French influence that on the surface has positives, but still leaves a bad taste in their mouth.

So in Algiers there are people like S—–, a Berber who worked with my husband at the US Embassy, who was a pacifist who prayed 5 times a day and wouldn’t go on his vacation to Spain because his wife would have had to show her ears in the visa photo. And then there’s the Tauregs down south (also Berbers), who are burning down Sufi shrines in Timbuktu. When looking at the motivation for AQIM factions (al quaeda in maghreb), the unifying theme that comes across is not that they have some coherent religious motivation for what they do, but that they want to look cool in the eyes of the neighborhood bully (al quaeda proper).

I’ve not read much of the Koran, but I’ve had conversations with Muslims from Shia, Sunni, and Sufi traditions, people living in the US, Algeria, and Uzbekistan, and interpretations of the Koran seem as diverse as Christian interpretations of the Bible. Just like the Bible, you can pick out texts that support whatever you want to do, be it slaughtering people or being a pacifist.

Someday (once I’m not beset with small children) I’d like to look into it more, but my working theory is that religion is more of a justification of behaviour than a cause. The points made about the salafists rewriting the past and then waging war against it fits in with this pretty well, in my mind.

In that case, the argument goes that while “tradition” as passed down within communities was the major driver of orthodox Jewish practice in the past, the younger generation now relies more on “texts” (which are in abundance in the orthodox Jewish world) to build their religious orientation. The “texts” represent a smorgasboard of belief and practice from which one can (and often does) pick the most stringent or “fundamentalist” option, even if it negates centuries of family or community tradition.

The driver of the switch from “tradition” to “text” is thought to be the destruction of European Jewish communities in the early 1940s, which scrambled communities and ruptured the generational chain. Not sure if there is a parallel to this in the Muslim world.

http://www.lookstein.org/links/orthodoxy.htm for those who are interested.

My own impression is that the Mongols destroying the centers of Islamic knowledge (and their population) had more impact on the intellectual direction of Islam than the musings of Al-Ghazali.

That the Mongols had an impact along with the Black Death is not in question to my mind.

However, while #31 has me chasing my tail in several different directions concurrently, I will offer the following, the author refutes the common belief about Al-Ghazali and points the finger towards the Sunni Nizamiyah colleges.

http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/how-the-decline-of-muslim-scientific-thought-still-haunts#full

Academics are correct in pinpointing the exact period in which Muslims began turning away from scientific innovation – the 11th century – but they have identified the wrong person. Abu Ali Al Hassan Al Tusi (1018-1092), better known as Nizam Al Mulk, the grand vizier of the Seljuq dynasty, was in fact the driving force.

Also, at roughly the same time of Al-Ghazali, the Church was condeming its own star clerics left and right. The battle between the conservatives and the philosophers was ongoing everywhere, and the conservatives held the position of power in both cases.

If the West had fallen back into high-middle-ages obscurity, maybe we would blame the Bishop of Paris for steering Christianity into darkness, falling to the classic correlation=causation bias.

My own impression is that the Mongols destroying the centers of Islamic knowledge (and their population) had more impact on the intellectual direction of Islam than the musings of Al-Ghazali.

this thread may serve a useful function!

Like enriching your ban list? Here’s hoping I’ll slip through once again!

Taliban also wanted money and attention (3 countries accepted their govt in Afghanistan, by that time) in late 90s, when they were being iconoclastic. It was pretty made-for-TV thing.

also, let me be frank and admit that my congeniality with the transparency of salafists vs. traditionalists at that age is a reflection of my mental immaturity, and lack of comprehension of lot of things. i now thing that the rationalism at the heart of salafism is a childish thing, appealing to childish people. it never appealed me because i’m an atheist, but i gave it too much credit vs. the traditionalists, who may not have been clear, but are truer to the complexity of the human condition.

i think that we need to be careful on overemphasizing the rationalist vs. orthodox (what became orthodox) position. the rationalist school actually exists today, but among the shia. rather than viewing ideology as a driver, i tend to see it as a signal or indicator. and often it is only informative after the fact. for example, one could argue that the reformation around luther represented a rejection of the renaissance humanism which peaked in the decade around his theses. this is entirely too simple, as obviously men like luther, calvin, and melanchthon were learned. but i think it is arguable that early protestantism had a moderate anti-greek bias, due to the strength of scholastic ideas within catholicism. but over the long term we don’t view the rise of the iconoclastic protestants as the beginning of the end for the closing of the christian mind, do we? a lot happened after the 16th century, and for various reasons intellectual activity increased more in protestant europe vs. catholic europe in the 18th and 19th centuries….

this is complex. consider: saudia arabia loves malls, and destroys ottoman architecture. the rejection of modernity is selective, and often contingent. e.g., female suicide bombers become OK with sophistic arguments if need be!

That would be the postmodern reaction you are referring to?

by post-modern, i mean to imply that many salafists are in truth post-materialist in their values, like western liberals, but a very different sort of post-materialist! the transition between ‘conservative traditionalist’ and ‘reformist modernizer’ can be explained by materialist terms, as villages become cities, and various organically developed local civic institutions collapse, replaced by more abstract entities (e.g., the state, university, the town, the lodge, etc.). but a reformist modern outlook, a variety of western liberalism, is not the only end point. the amish for example are in many ways an artificial people who specific maintain 18th century folkways for explicitly ideological reasons. they are primitive christians, but don’t really resemble primitive christians of the 2nd and 3rd centuries from what i have read. amish ‘conservatism’ is actually a really radical utopianism, which diverges from liberal modernity, but can’t be understood except in the context of early modernity. my argument is that salafism is best understood in the same light. the destruction of genuinely traditional indigenous structures, analogous to what you see in extreme forms of secular leftism, is entirely intelligible in this light.

Further, I would add that most people in America, living in a place where religion is entirely a choice, fail to understand the intertwining of the state with religion that is at the heart and founding of Islam.

i think you in the passage before this confuse salafism for a broader strain in islam which rejects the western trend toward separation of the sacred and profane. salafists do reject this, but so do most muslims, or at least on the order of 50 percent. rather than issues of church and state, i think salafism is distinctive in that it positively encourages a stripping away of the “olds”, a deracination and transformation into the ‘islamic man.’ i have talked to some salafist informed muslims in bangladesh. i disagreed with their arguments, but they’re totally intelligible and honestly refreshingly anti-traditional compared to many other muslims, who rely on implicit background assumptions and the wisdom of the ages.

thanks. but the issue i’m having is what % of egyptians are members of *tribes*

My understanding is around 2-3% Bedouins.

My bad. That was very careless of me and led to an incorrect perception.

Humble apologies proffered.

Razib Khan Says:
July 8th, 2012 at 7:16 pm

my argument is that modern radical salafism is ruptured from real tradition

OK fine, I was not going to say anything but after those displays of “Teh Stupids” I figure I can not do worse. I seriously doubt that what I am about to say will contribute to your knowledge, but it is quite clear that I know more than at least two of your (now former?) readers, and quite possibly this may help some other reader avoid the ban hammer.

First, a thumbnail sketch:

http://muslimcanada.org/binladendawn.html

In short, the battle being waged today is at heart an internal Islamic one and may take a very long time to end. It is part of a larger battle about the very nature of Islamic society and politics, and one in which there are many sides (moderate Muslims, state-sponsored Muslims, radical and moderate Salafis, secular nationalists, and Shi’ah

Emphasis mine. Seriously people, if your only source of knowledge is the mainstream media you are not qualified to have an opinion about Islam as a whole, much less what Razib is concerned about.

My underinformed view nonetheless suggests that policy prescription are possible if you bear the following in mind:

The House of Saud has a historical relationship that enabled them to cut a deal with the Wahhabi with mutual supports for authority and funding. This is by no means a universally approved relationship, for example :

Historical Mecca was destroyed by a combination of Wahhabi Salafi dogma against history and the greed of the princes and developers.

I would posit that curbing modern radical salafism means that the linkage with traditional salafism has to be cut if you subscribe to the notion that the former is nourished by the latter, and in any event it is the funding by the House of Saud and other wealthy individuals that enables both to flourish.

How you would tease apart the strands and sever them is beyond the scope of this comment and my knowledge, other than to note my assumption that this can only be done by Muslims themselves, and interjecting any Western actors into this process at any point, will represent a fairly high probability of presenting negative impacts towards any sort of an equitable resolution.

Without a doubt there will not be a smooth political/societal transformation given that among other things, that the House of Saud, apparently perceives that continued rule is only possible within the current framework, and to say that I would expect some resistance from all sides, is to understate the case by a significant order of magnitude.

The possibilities for blunders by the West while the current conflicts within Islam are played out are significant, although I believe they could be mitigated with just a little more awareness than has been displayed.

As it is, the current level of ignorance has consequences. For instance, I view the folly of disbanding the Iraq army instead of assuming command as one example of a missed opportunity caused by ignorance.

The surrender of Iraq’s 51st Infantry Division for example, could have played a key role in subsequent societal stability. The 51st comprised approximately 8,000 Sunni soldiers, whereas the Shia make up the majority of the population. Cutting them loose with the attendant loss of income, into a population who already had no reason to love them was not a good idea. They could have been more effectively utilized to mitigate the subsequent and inevitable sectarian violence.

Another example is where the US military appeared to be completely oblivious to the reason why the “surge” was successful in Iraq and the subsequent failure when they tried to replicate it in Afghanistan.

The reality is that the success of the surge can be directly attributed to the fact that the local population in Iraq saw no other choice if they were to rid themselves of the radical salafis, but to utilize the US Military to help them do so, and the situation on the ground in Afghanistan precluded a repeat of that strategy.

In any event, this is not the first time that Islam has undergone a major upheaval, and my understanding is that arguably the defeat of the rationalist philoposy of Averroes (Ibn Rushd), by the dogmatic theology of Al-Ghazali is directly responsible for the current situation.

In any event as I inferred earlier, I do not foresee the West currently making positive contributions towards conflict resolution except inadvertently, and certainly not while the current level of general awareness is upheld.

End of Rant.

Some of the most underused narratives that are fairly helpful IMHO, are:

* the narrative of modern politics in the Near East as a part of the ongoing story of the fall out from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.
* any narrative that makes clear that global Islam is not monolithic.
* any narrative that provides a human scale description of what it is like to live day to day in a particular place from a particular perspective so that you escape all the generalities.
* any narrative that clarifies the extend of government power in day to day life vis-a-vis other business and NGO and family and tribal and foreign business/government institutions.
* reports that take a long view over time frames of older adults alive today and what they’ve been through.

My understanding is that it does play a role, though moreso in Rural Egypt [pgs. 150, 151-54]:
H/T to HDB chick:

http://books.google.com/books?id=gZbRAOFJLBEC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Development+and+Social+Change+in+Rural+Egypt&hl=en&sa=X&ei=5uO8T_PSBMGg4gTfuP3mCg&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Development%20and%20Social%20Change%20in%20Rural%20Egypt&f=false

Also see:
https://hbdchick.wordpress.com/2012/05/23/voting-patterns-and-clans-in-egypt/

any and all analyses of the egyptian political situation that you (we) get via western newspapers and media sources will be seriously lacking in insight if they don’t take into account the role of extended families and clans at really every level of egyptian society including the political. and they don’t usually include this, so we really don’t understand what the h*ck is happening there.

is egypt is a tribal society by and large? my understanding is that it was not, though some are members of tribes.

Education Realist Says:
July 7th, 2012 at 5:45 pm

Egypt isn’t a petro state, yet still has similar issues. I agree that the petro states are a special case, but that makes it all the worse. By our normal lights, we’d expect these countries to embrace modernism. Instead, the people constantly force their leaders towards fundamentalism.

My understanding is that the situation in Egypt makes sense, once you understand the roles that tribalism and kinship have on voting patterns.

Actors within the Egyptian Military are perceived to be heavily involved in corrupt economic activities, thus tainting all associated with them. These factors tend to limit choices if you are a reform minded voter.