For the record, I suppose I deserve some credit for the term “militant atheists” as a more accurate description of “New Atheists” like Richard Dawkins, PZ Myers and Jerry Coyne, to name but a few. All of them regard religion as a ridiculous human activity that deserves eventual extinction. They also are adamant – which is why I refer to them as “militant” – in their demand that, under no circumstances, should science be seen as compatible to religion. However, what they don’t realize is that there are many “theistic evolutionists” and other religi0usly devout scientists who recognize that science must, and should be seen, as having substantial priority over religious faith on issues that pertain directly to science. For example, I have heard this for years from devout Christian and Jewish scientists. This is why these scientists do regard themselves as methodological naturalists, who suspend any religious thinking while they work as scientists. I believe that this is an important distinction that appears to be lost on the likes of Coyne and Myers, especially with their lamentable and risible charges of “accomodationism” aimed at science advocacy and professional scientific organizations like NCSE, NAS and AAAS.

I’d never thought of it, if both are based on no information, I don’t see how you could escape that conclusion. In that case you’d be talking about the person doing the believing and not on what’s being believed.

Is there a difference in the quality of the belief in, say, continental drift, between someone who has read a large chunk of the published science literature and actually understands it as opposed to someone who watched a ten minute mention of it on some sciency TV show? I’d think so.

I wasn’t addressing the quality of what’s believed but the fact that no one has mastered the background of every idea they accept as established fact. I’d hate to have to master the parts of the Principia that comes before the 1+1 proposition, especially what happened after it was published.

By mentioning Ken Miller’s beliefs as an example, I am merely trying to demonstrate why the differences defined by the militant atheist crowd should, as tom w, has perceived correctly, should be a matter that is far more nuanced than they themselves would admit.

This does not mean that all philosophy is incompatible with science.

Of course not, but problems can arise when both science and philosophy (or religion) posit something about the same idea, even if it is indirectly. This is often the case with religion, because most religions make claims that science can address.

I don’t see how any of that addresses the question of whether “militant atheists” can fairly be charged with ignoring the point made by tom w.

tom w,

We might actually be in agreement, though obscured by sloppy thinking and writing on my part. For my main point, I did not need to endorse the claim that simple deism can come into conflict with science, or the reasoning often adduced on its behalf. I merely needed to draw attention to it, since that alone suffices to defend “militant atheists” against the charge of ignoring your point. Indeed, I don’t recall having endorsed anything, though upon review it appears I did.

But I’m of two minds about whether the claim and the reasoning are on the right track. On the one hand, I’m inclined to agree with you that science and its norms are silent on any reality lying beyond any possible broadly empirical detection—in which case even the most gaga bonkers “What the Bleep Do We Know” nonsense can be believed on utterly insane grounds by scientists, all without any strict departure from scientific norms.

But on the other hand, I do not agree that science remains silent on questions of what really exists (or at least I do not agree with the surely-far-too-authoritative tone with which you deny realism in the philosophy of science). I mean, if a scientist discovers a new planet, but then denies its real existence, this must be deemed extremely psychologically unusual, if not flatly incoherent. Scientific practice certainly seems to be of a piece with a broader realist epistemic practice, where we seek good reasons for holding beliefs about reality, not merely empirically adequate models which have no bearing on our beliefs about reality.

Indeed, you yourself appear to vacillate between two positions here. The stronger (and less plausible) view is that science says absolutely nothing about reality (it “concern[s] model-building, not metaphysics”). In that case, once a scientist avows the real existence of Neptune, she has stopped doing science—and this is pretty hard to swallow. The weaker (and far more plausible) view is merely that “[m]etaphysics is underdetermined by science”, which can be set aside as undisputed common ground.

But then, given some sort of realism about scientific practice, there appears to be at least a serious psychological conflict between (i) carefully applying scientific norms in order to uncover truths about reality, and (ii) wildly positing truths about reality with madcap epistemic abandon. If someone goes in for the latter, this rightly raises our suspicions about their facility with the former. If someone eagerly swallows every last thing they see in “What the Bleep Do We Know”, though it is logically possible they might still do excellent scientific work, there is a genuine conflict worth our concern.

And then, to the extent that religious belief is like that (a separate and important question), we have a genuine conflict on our hands.

Dave2, we’re not in agreement. There seems to be no compelling reason to posit a grand creative intelligence, but there’s no conflict with science. The epistemic norms of science concern model-building, not metaphysics. Theories that make identical empirical predictions are not distinguished in science. Metaphysics is underdetermined by science and this gives philosophers and religious thinkers a lot of freedom in their theorizing (though philosophical principles may reduce the freedom).

You may be surprised to know that, when it comes to science, Ken Miller stresses the primacy of science over religion with respect to scientific issues. Indeed, if Jason Rosenhouse is honest about his encounter with Ken Miller in Cincinnati last Thursday during the 9th North American Paleontological Convention, then he will tell those reading his blog that Ken did emphasize this to him. So does Jesuit brother – and distinguished Vatican astronomer and planetary scientist Guy Consolmagno. So does Jerry Coyne’s eminent colleague, a former Dominician monk , notable evolutionary geneticist Francisco J. Ayala. And this is true too of eminent ecologist Michael L. Rosenzweig – a devout Conservative Jew – and countless others who are religiously devout scientists.

Now I will admit that I agree more with Massimo Pigliucci’s excellent refutation of Ken Miller’s religiously-inspired “weak version” of the anthropic principle than with Ken’s promotion of it (which you can read in the February 2009 entries at Massimo’s “Rationally Speaking” blog), which I am sure, will come to a surprise to many who perceive me as Ken Miller’s “toy poodle” (which is noted over at Jerry Coyne’s blog by one of his enthusiastic sycophants). But though I find an atheist’s (Piglucci) analysis of Miller’s thought acceptable, I don’t quite go anywhere near the risible, often hysterical, commentary I have read written by Jerry Coyne and his favorite “first class mind”, PZ Myers. In attacking Ken Miller, NCSE, World Science Festival, and similar scientists, science advocacy organizations and professional scientific organizations, Coyne, Myers and their fellow militant atheists are demonstrating – and this is quite ironic – that those who are really on the side of rational thought are such thoughtful religiously-devout scientists like those of cited, not these Militant Atheists, whose online behavior etc. more closely resembles those of irrational Xian creationists like Dembski, Ham, Luskin and Nelson.

I’m not sure what you’re suggesting, but I’m getting suspicious.

Consider the average commenter’s uninformed trust in the scientific community when it comes to, say, continental drift. Now consider the average Mormon’s trust in the LDS church’s claims concerning the ancestry of Native Americans. Are you suggesting that these are on an equal footing?

I mean, it looks like you’re equating the most reasonable kind of trust to the least reasonable kind of trust.