Thanks. That does make it a bit clearer. I have to admit I’m a bit puzzled by the complexity of these examples. The way it’s written, Dan knows (or at least has reason to expect) he’s condemning his visitors to certain death, but he’s not directly killing them – the viruses do. From what I know of the classic moral dilemmas, people are more willing to let one person die to save five others than to actively harm that one person to the same effect. I wonder how the VMPCs would have fared if Dan had taken a more directly active role in the visitors’ demise by trying to take them out with a gun?

Are people who are inclined to overlook the attempted murder also more likely to blame an accident as if it were murder? Or are there very different mechanisms involved in blaming others for evil intentions, versus absolving others for benign intentions after a traumatic event?

In a similar vein, what happens if Dan behaves in a manner that is not certain to lead to harm but makes it much more likely? Say, Dan didn’t know the switch was broken because he couldn’t be bothered with all the usual safety procedures? Or, Dan gets behind the wheel drunk as a skunk and mows down some unsuspecting pedestrian (or not)?

That is, are people with VMPC damage as capable of assessing WHAT intent is of a particular sequence of actions in isolation of ANY consequences?

Maybe I’m overthinking or misinterpreting this, but it sounds as if Young doesn’t know whether the brain damaged patients didn’t know Dan’s intentions, or knew but didn’t care. Isn’t that something she could have found out by simply asking them?