Comments on: Larger monkey groups lose fights because they contain more deserters

By: Enea

Enea — Sat, 31 Dec 2011 22:31:30 +0000

Good introduction with the analogy to the Greek and Persian armies. Strategy in a war is as important as the number of soldiers… maybe even more important

By: Tor Bertin

Tor Bertin — Sat, 31 Dec 2011 21:29:12 +0000

I’d be curious to see why the center of the home range is of such importance. Are there specific topographic/vegetative features that lend themselves towards victory more than others? If so, can we find evidence of capuchins creating home ranges around more readily defendible areas? Or, is it just a matter of familiarity with the landscape and a sense of security being well away from the territory of your enemies?

Interesting study!

By: Frank Jeffers

Frank Jeffers — Fri, 30 Dec 2011 13:33:55 +0000

A better example might have been Custer’s last stand. That was only one battle of four or five, all of which U.S. troops lost, in a war that the united states lost. Another company of U.S. troops was wiped out the same day. An entire battalion was kept pinned down for 3 days without food or water. Custer thought he was the advanced force for a powerful column that was supposed to arrive on the other side of the Indian encampment and force its surrender. What he didn’t know was the Indians had forced the withdrawal of that column the previous day.
That engagement involved the column trying to make its way7 up a valley with its wagons and artillery and finding their way blocked by Indians firing on them from a ridge. The general sent his best troops to clear the ridge, which they did with heavy casualties- and found there entrenchments and rifle pits the Indians knew how to construct because many were civil war veterans. The Indians had accurate repeating rifles and made their living by their marksmanship. They were defending their wives and children. The U.S. soldiers found the ridge raked by accurate rifle fire from entrenchments on neighboring ridges and could go no further. Most of the troops in the Army in those post civil war days were ne’er-do-wells and derelicts and the U.S. general knew night was falling and with his unreliable troops it was going to be pistols, knives, and tomahawks all night long, and come morning he would be lucky if there was any organization left in his command at all. He wisely withdrew. On reaching the little Big horn a few days later and discovering the slaughter there, he decided against pursuing Sitting Bull further- with the casualties he’d already taken, the demoralization of his troops, unreliable out the outset, and the likelihood of further prepared ambushes and counterattacks, he knew he’d been defeated. New York Times articles of the period describe the whole thing.

By: Anita

Anita — Thu, 29 Dec 2011 22:48:44 +0000

A cogent argument against invading any foreign country. Defenders are fierce because it is HOME and ferocity can triumph over technology and numbers. Ask anyone who has ever fought a guerilla war. Heating fuel, fuses and cans can disable million dollar military vehicles.

By: donK

donK — Thu, 29 Dec 2011 16:20:35 +0000

It would be interesting to see if reduced desertion in a monkey group could lead them to take over the world. Of course they would have stiff competition from one that already has.

By: Sherry Austin

Sherry Austin — Tue, 27 Dec 2011 23:24:27 +0000

This is amazing.

By: Nathan Myers

Nathan Myers — Tue, 27 Dec 2011 23:02:15 +0000

A distinction between “defection” and “desertion” seems relevant here. “The problem of defection” hasn’t been demonstrated here, but would be equally interesting. Where possible, I expect it would favor bigger groups, and select against grudge-holders in small groups.

By: David Dobbs

David Dobbs — Tue, 27 Dec 2011 21:31:52 +0000

Quite an intriguing study. It seems to me a prime lesson here is the extra motivation that comes from defending turf as opposed to taking it: the defender has far more to lose than the attacker (and also knows the terrain better). And the threat *feels* proximate and ever so real — another big difference from the case with, say, climate change, where the threat seems distant and diffuse.

By: AG

AG — Tue, 27 Dec 2011 18:37:07 +0000

Bystander effect seems at work here. Can not believe monkeys have human problem.

By: Richard Harper

Richard Harper — Tue, 27 Dec 2011 18:10:43 +0000

There’s a cultural technology for that, discussed in a fun short essay published in 1984. The title’s not very informative but the essay is about historically-used methods for reducing shirking during combat. (View in essay is also that shirking increases with size of army, see 11th paragraph.) http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Academic/economic_of_war/the_economics_of_war.htm